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Elaine Craig*

Section 2(b) Advertising Rights on
Government Property: Greater Vancouver

Transportation Authority, A New Can of
Worms and the Liberty Two-Step?
The Supreme Court's recent decision inVancouver Transportation is problematic
for two reasons. First, the majority adopts an analytical framework for determining
whether a claim triggers the positive rights Dunmore/Baier analysis, which means
that policies restricting expressive rights based on groups rather than content
could be less likely to fall within the scope of section 2(b). A better approach
would be to characterize section 2(b) cases based on the nature of the claim
rather than the nature of the restriction and to apply the positive rights Dunmorel
Baier criteria only where the claim is for an audience with the government or
access to government funding. Second, the Court's section 1 analysis provides
sparse and problematic guidance for addressing the now opened can of worms
that is sure to arise from the government sale of private advertising in a legal
context that draws the censorship line above controversial content but below
offensive content.
.L'arr~t r6cent de la Cour supreme Greater Vancouver Transportation pose
probl~me pour deux motifs. Tout d'abord, la majorit6 adopte un cadre d'analyse
pour ddterminer si une all6gation ddclenche I'analyse des droits positifs 6tablie
dans les arr6ts Dunmore et Baier, ce qui signifie que les politiques qui imposent
des restrictions &Iactivit&expressive en fonction de groupes plutit qu'en fonction
du contenu du message pourraient 6tre moins susceptibles d'6tre vis6es par 'al.
2b). Une approche prdfdrable serait de caract6riser les affaires qui invoquent
'al. 2b) en se fondant sur la nature de I'alldgation plutdt que sur la nature de la
restriction, et d'appliquer les critbres 6nonc6s dans les arrats Dunmore et Baier
pour determiner les droits positifs uniquement lorsque la demande vise un accds
au gouvernement ou l'acc~s au financement par le gouvernement. De plus,
I'analyse que fait la Cour de 'article 1 ne donne que des indications vagues et
probldmatiques pour traiter la pl6thore de questions litigieuses qui ne manqueront
pas d'6tre soulev6es par la vente de publicit6 priv6e par le gouvernement.dans
un contexte juridique qui trace la ligne de censure au-dessus du contenu portant
&controverse mais sous le contenu offensant.
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Introduction
Are public transit authorities allowed to censor from public buses an
advertisement denying the existence of god? What about a pro-life
advertisement depicting an aborted fetus or one that quotes Leviticus
20:13? These are the types of issues with which transit authorities have
begun, and will undoubtedly continue, to grapple in light of the Supreme
Court of Canada's recently released decision' upholding expressive rights
to private advertising on publicly owned property.2

1. Greater Vancouver TransportationAuthority v. CanadianFederationofStudents, 2009 SCC 31,
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 [Vancouver TransportationAuthority].
2.
This controversy has already come to the fore across Canada; public transit authorities in cities
such as Halifax and Victoria have refused to post the Humanist Society of Canada's advertisements
declaring that "you can be good without God" (see: "'Good without God'ad campaign raises questions
in Vancouver" CBC News (3 February 2009), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.calcanadaibritishcolumbia/story/2009/02/03/bc-good-without-god-ads.html>). In Halifax the ad was rejected because
the Halifax public transit policy refuses ads that are objectionable to any moral standard or that do not
meet acceptable community standards of good taste, quality and appearance. Similar reasoning was
given by B.C. transit authorities in Victoria. The Halifax transit authorities reversed their position after
the Vancouver TransportationAuthority decision was released in July, 2009 (In the United Kingdom
and Australia humanist organizations have launched publicity campaigns with bus ads declaring that
"there is probably no God so relax and enjoy life." (See <http://www.atheisteampaign.org> accessed
September 1, 2009). The type of advertisement quoting Leviticus 20:13 has been the subject of
controversy in the private sphere. See Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission), 2005
SKCA 103, [2005] S.J. No. 515 where a human rights complaint was made against an individual who
quoted Leviticus 20:13 in an anti-gay advertisement in a Saskatchewan newspaper. The human rights
claim was dismissed on appeal. A determination that these types of ads do not constitute hate speech
and do not violate human rights code protections, in conjunction with the Court's ruling in Vancouver
TransportationAuthority, could open the door for those interested in posting such advertisements on
the sides of public buses.
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In Greater Vancouver TransportationA uthorityv. Canadian Federation
of Students the Court struck down Vancouver transit authority policies
that stipulated that advertising on public buses could not have political
or controversial content. BC Transit and Translink, both determined
by the Supreme Court of Canada to be government actors for purposes
of Charter application, had for a number of years earned revenues by
selling advertising space on their buses. Both BC Transit and Translink
had adopted written policies that stipulated that they would only accept
advertisements that communicated information about goods, services,
public events and public service announcements. Under the policies of
both transit authorities, advertisements that included political speech or
advertisements that were, in light of prevailing community standards of
tolerance, likely to create controversy or cause offence, were not to be
accepted.
In the summer and fall of 2004 the Canadian Federation of Students
and the British Columbia Teachers' Federation tried to purchase advertising
space on the sides of buses operated by BC Transit and Translink. They
wanted to post advertisements encouraging young people to vote in the
upcoming provincial election. 3 The transit authorities did not accept their
advertisements on the basis that their content was not permitted by the
advertising policies. The British Columbia Teachers' Federation and the
Canadian Federation of Students commenced an action alleging that the
transit authorities' policies violated their right to freedom of expression
under section 2(b) of the Charter. The trial judge denied their claim on
the basis that the sides of buses did not constitute a "public space" for

3. The Canadian Federation of Students wanted to place two advertisements. The first
advertisement would have run the length of the side of the bus and included the following text:
"Register now. Learn the issues. Vote May 17, 2005. ROCKTHEVOTEBC.com." The second would
have said: "Tuition fees ROCKTHEVOTEBC.com Minimum wage ROCKTHEVOTEBC.com
Environment ROCKTHEVOTEBC.com." The British Columbia Teachers' Federation sought to place
an advertisement stating: "2,500 fewer teachers, 114 schools closed. Your kids. Our students. Worth
speaking out for." (Vancouver Transportation Authority, supra note I at para. 3).
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purposes of section 2(b).4 However, their claim was successful on appeal.
The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal found that the trial
judge had erred in considering the content of the desired advertisement
when determining whether the sides of buses constituted a public place.
"According to Prowse J.A., BC Transit and TransLink had a history of
permitting advertising on their buses, and expression in this location could
not therefore be viewed as inimical to the function of the buses as vehicles
for public transportation."'
The transit authorities sought and were granted leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada. The Court, both the majority and Justice Fish
in concurrence, held that the transit policies did violate section 2(b) and
that these violations could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.
There are two problematic aspects of the Court's reasoning in Vancouver
TransportationAuthority.
The first difficulty pertains to the analytical framework adopted by
the majority to address the transit authorities' assertions that the claim
made by the respondents would place a positive obligation on the
government. Justice Deschamps, writing for the majority, determined that
the respondents' claim did not trigger a positive rights analysis because the
transit authorities' policies targeted content, not groups, and because the
claim was not tied to a particular government-created means of expression.

He drew this conclusion because there was no history of their ever having permitted political or
4.
advocacy advertising on the sides of buses. He relied, in part, on Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974) in order to arrive at this conclusion. As pointed out by the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in this case, Canadian courts have not followed the doctrinal approach adopted in American
public forum cases like Lehman. In Montreal (City of) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., 2005 SCC 62,
3 S.C.R. 141 [City of Montreal] the Court determined, at para. 74, that restrictions to the scope of
protection for expressive rights on government property should be assessed based on "whether the
place is a public place where one would expect constitutional protection for free expression on the
basis that expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s. 2(b) is intended to serve,
namely [I] democratic discourse, [2] truth finding and [3] self-fulfillment." In answering that question,
courts are to consider the historical or actual function of the place and whether there are other aspects
of the place to suggest that expression within it would undermine the values underlying freedom of
expression. The content of the actual expression at issue is not considered at this stage of the analysis.
As an aside, this test is somewhat confusing. It almost suggests duelling zones/scopes of expressive
protection. It works for the example of the Prime Minister's office but is less sensible in the context,
for example, of the air traffic control tower. Is it really that section 2(b) protection does not extend
to the air traffic control tower because expression in that place would conflict with the promotion of
democratic discourse and truth finding given the air traffic control tower's actual function or rather
is it that we do not want airplanes to crash? This question raises a separate issue with section 2(b)
which is not the focus of this paper and which was the source of debate in the Court's earlier decisions
on section 2(b) (see for example Justice Lamer's approach and Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's approach
in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] I S.C.R. 139 [Committee]. But
see Richard Moon's critique of Justice Lamer's strictly functional approach in Richard Moon, The
ConstitutionalProtectionofFreedom of Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
Vancouver TransportationAuthority, supranote I at para. 4.
5.
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Justice Fish wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed that the claim
was not for a positive right but disagreed with the majority in terms of
how they arrived at this conclusion. Recall that the respondents, the
Canadian Federation of Students and the British Columbia Teachers'
Federation, had both tried to purchase advertising space encouraging
citizens to vote in the upcoming provincial election. BC Transit and
TransLink argued that what the respondents were claiming was a positive
right to a government-created means of expression. As discussed below,
in previous cases the Court determined that claims for an expressive right
that can be characterized as claims of underinclusion in a governmentcreated platform for expression (a claim for a positive right) will only
be protected in very limited circumstances. As such, the outcome can
turn on whether a claim is one that will fall under the Court's positive
rights section 2(b) analysis. Unfortunately, in this case, in determining
what types of section 2(b) cases will engage a positive rights analysis (an
analysis which severely limits the scope of protection under section 2(b)),
the majority relied on a puzzling and potentially problematic analytical
distinction between excluding speakers (restrictions targeted at groups)
and excluding speeches (restrictions targeted at content).
The second difficulty with the reasoning in Vancouver Transportation
Authority pertains to the section 1 analysis adopted by the majority (and
endorsed by Justice Fish) with respect to justifying the exclusion of
some content from advertising space sold by the government. The Court
determined that while government actors can justifiably censor offensive
content from the advertising space that they sell, they cannot justifiably
censor controversial content. In order to distinguish between offensive
and controversial content the Court acknowledged that a community
standards of tolerance test might offer the appropriate guidance. The
forecasted problems to come, such as those suggested in the opening
paragraph, stem from the difficulty in relying on a community standard
of tolerance test to determine a principled and just distinction between
what are offensive advertisements on government-owned property and
what are merely controversial advertisements on government-owned
property. Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, this is a challenge
that the Court's decision did not meet. While the Court focused primarily
on.political advertising (as that was what was at issue in Vancouver
TransportationAuthority) they drew conclusions and made suggestions
which, when considered in the context of advocacy advertising, are
problematic.
The first part of this discussion will examine and critique the majority's
approach to determining whether a particular claim is for a positive right
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under section 2(b). The second part of the discussion will consider their
section I analysis and the difficulty with the suggestion that distinctions
between offensive (justifiably censored) advertising and controversial
(unjustifiably censored) advertising on government-owned property be
made based on community notions of public decency.
I. The majority's section 2(b) analysis
The majority divided its section 2(b) analysis into two sections. The first
section of their analysis addressed the transit authorities' argument that
the respondents were seeking to gain access to a particular governmentcreated platform for expression and that this claim of underinclusion,
were it successful, would place government entities under a positive
obligation with respect to the respondents' expressive rights. In other
words, the transit authorities argued that the respondents' claim for a right
to the advertising space triggered the "positive rights" analysis that the
Court has adopted in prior cases. Section 2(b), but for the exceptional
circumstances discussed below, does not protect claims characterized as
seeking a positive right. After rejecting the transit authorities' suggestion
regarding the positive nature of the right claimed, the majority determined
that the method or location of the expression (advertising on the sides of
government-owned buses) did not remove the primafacie protection of
section 2(b)-as dictated by the test adopted by the Court in Montreal
(City of) v. 2952-1366 Qudbec Inc.6"It is the first part of the majority's
section 2(b) analysis-the part addressing the issue of positive rights to
government-created platforms of expression-that will be focused on in
the paragraphs to follow.
After acknowledging the traditionally generous and purposive but
not unlimited interpretation of rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
Charter the majority began its section 2(b) analysis by noting that the
government is not typically under an obligation to provide individuals
with a particular means of expression.' "Thus, where the government
creates such a means, it is generally entitled to determine which speakers
are allowed to participate. A speaker who is excluded from such means
does not have a section 2(b) right to participate unless she or he meets the
criteria set out in Baier"'
Baier v. Alberta established the very limited circumstances in which
section 2(b) creates a positive right requiring the government to extend
an underinclusive means of, or platform for, expression to an individual
6.
7.
8.

Supra note 4.
Supra note I at para. 29.
ibid.
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or group.9 In order to determine what those very limited circumstances
will be, the Court in Baier relied on the section 2(d) analysis adopted
in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General). 0 Dunmore identified those
exceptional circumstances in which the government is under a positive
obligation to facilitate a group's freedom to associate. Dunmore extended
the scope of section 2(d) protection to claims of underinclusiveness
only where the following criteria are met: i) the claim is grounded in a
fundamental Charter freedom rather than access to a particular statutory
regime; ii) the exclusion results in a substantial interference with
the protected activity (or that is the exclusion's purpose) and; iii) the
government inaction substantially orchestrates, encourages or sustains the
violation of fundamental freedoms." The criteria in Dunmore create a
very narrow exception to the principle that the government is under no
obligation to enable the exercise of one's section 2 guarantees. As Justice
Fish noted in his concurrence in Vancouver TransportationAuthority, the
exception created in Dunmorewas really only intended for situations where
a fundamental right cannot otherwise be exercised.12 The respondents'
claim in Vancouver Transportation Authority would not satisfy the criteria
established in Dunmore and adopted in Baier. There was nothing to
suggest that the respondents in Vancouver Transportation Authority would
be unable to express themselves in other forums. Had the Baier analysis
applied, the respondents' claim would almost certainly have been denied.
In other words, had the Court determined that requiring the government to
allow access to the advertising space on public buses constituted a claim
to a positive right, the appeal would have been allowed and the transit
policies held to be constitutionally sound.
1.

The majority ' treatment ofBaier

The majority concluded that the Baier analytical framework was not the
appropriate analysis for this claim. In Baier the claimants argued that it
2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 [Baier]. For a discussion of the Baier decision see Robert E.
9.
Charney, "The Shaky Foundation of 'Statutory Platforms': A Comment on Baier v. Alberta" (2008) 42
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 115.
10. 2001 SCC 94, 3 S.C.R. 1016 [Dunmore]. There are a number of articles discussing-the
implications of the Court's analysis in Dunmore. See for example Steven Barett, "Dunmore v. Ontario
(Attorney General): Freedom of Association at the Crossroads" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 83; Patricia
Hughes, "Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General): Waiting for the Other Shoe" (2003), 10 C.L.E.
LJ. 27; B. Jamie Cameron, "The 'Second Labour Trilogy': A Comment on R. v. Advance Cutting,
Dunmore v. Ontario, and R.W.D.S.U. v. Pepsi-Cola" (2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 67.
11. Dunmore, ibid. at para. 26.
12. Supra note I at para. 105. For example, the criteria were met where removing vulnerable
agricultural workers from the protections of a labour relations legislative framework would reinforce
their vulnerability and make them essentially incapable of exercising their freedom to associate. This
was the factual circumstance in Dunmore, ibid.
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was a violation of section 2(b) to prohibit all teachers in Alberta from
standing for election to the office of school trustee and serving as a school
trustee without taking a leave of absence from, and if successful in their
candidacy resigning from, their teaching position." The Court in Baier
denied the claim on the basis that what the claimants sought was inclusion
in an underinclusive statutory scheme, that this was the hallmark of a
positive rights claim and that this was not a positive rights claim fulfilling
the Dunmore criteria.
The majority in Vancouver TransportationAuthority determined that
the Baier analytical framework was not the appropriate analysis for this
claim on two bases. First, they determined that the transit authorities'
characterization of the claim as one of underinclusiveness could not
succeed because the appellants had not demonstrated that the respondents
themselves were excluded from the particular means of expression. 4 The
transit policies, they determined, did not prevent the respondents from
using the advertising service; the policy only restricted the content of their
advertisements. Second, they rejected the transit authorities' argument
that the exercise of expression in this context was a positive right because
it required support and enablement in order to convey the message. They
determined that the need for government "support or enablement" in order
to express oneself was not enough to construe a claim as an assertion of a
positive right. They held that the respondents were not requesting that the
government support or enable their expressive activity by providing them
with a particular means of expression from which they were excluded.
Instead, they determined that what the respondents sought was to express
themselves-by means of an existing platform they were entitled to usewithout undue state interference with the content of their expression.
2. Problem with relying on the distinction between the speaker and the
speech
The majority's analytical framework for determining that Baier and the
positive rights analysis did not apply is problematic. The first difficulty
with their approach, which was acknowledged in Justice Fish's concurring
13. Baier, supra note 9. One might question, as did Justice Lebel in his concurring opinion in
Baier, whether the claim in this case truly engaged the protection of freedom of expression under
section 2(b). In his view the right to run for office as a school trustee, and if elected take part in the
management of the school board, does not constitute a communicative act as required to qualify as
expression under section 2(b). He would have denied the claim in Baier not because it was a positive
claim to expressive rights but rather because it was a claim to a right to stand for office in a context not
covered by section 3 of the Charter
14. Supra note I at para. 32: "[S]uffice it to say that to succeed in its ... claim ... ofunderinclusiveness,
BC transit had to at least demonstrate that the respondents themselves were excluded from the
particular means of expression."
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opinion, stems from the analytical significance they attributed to the
distinction between speakers and speech. Under the majority's analytical
framework, where the exclusion from the government means of expression
is based on the speaker, the Baier analysis, assuming the claim is for a
government means or platform as understood by the majority, will apply.
Where the exclusion is based on the content of the expression Baier will
not apply." As noted by Justice Fish, "except artificially, it seems difficult
to divorce content discrimination from group discrimination, since many
groups are bound together by the content of their shared convictions or
concerns... .To still the messenger is to suppress the message." 6
Under the majority's analytical approach a claim against a government
policy that denied access to groups to a particular government-created
platform for expression would be subject to the more stringent Dunmore/
Baier criteria whereas a denial based on content would not. Excepting
those groups that might find shelter under the equalilty guarantees of
section 15, this could lead to absurd results for groups or classes of people
seeking access to government-created means of expression." Think for
example of a policy that restricts access to a government-provided means
of expression for messages in support of labour rights. Now consider a
policy that excludes unions of any kind from accessing a governmentcreated platform of expression. The determination as to whether a positive
rights analysis should apply should not be different simply because the
policy targeted not political content but potentially politicized groups.
This is particularly true given that, as a result of how limited the positive
right recognized under section 2(b) is, a determination as to whether a
government policy or law violates section 2(b) will often turn on whether
the-claim is for a positive right.
The majority's reasoning also implies that where the policy (or law
or government act) restricts the content of what can be expressed in a
government platform, the narrowed scope of the protected freedom, as
determined by the Baier/ Dunmore criteria, will never apply." In other

15. Supra note 1at para. 32.
16. Ibid. at para. 109
17. There is a question as to whether it was even appropriate in Baier to apply the Dunmore analysis
(established in the context of section 2(d) rights to associate) to claims under section 2(b). There is
a qualitative distinction between the nature of group-oriented claims of association and claims of
freedom to expression that suggests the same analysis ought not to apply to both. However, if the
majority meant to address this issue they ought to have done so by overruling Baier and determining
that Dunmore be limited to association rights, not by suggesting that Dunmore/Baier only be applied
in expression cases involving groups.
18. She states at para. 32 "[o]nly the content of their advertisements is restricted. Thus, their claim
cannot be characterized as one against underinclusion." Supra note 1.
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words, their decision suggests that an expressive right that is restricted
based on content never falls under a positive rights type analysis regardless
as to the government means or platform claimed. This is also problematic.
Think of a factual circumstance similar in nature to the one at issue in
Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada.'9 There, the Native
Women's Association of Canada (NWAC) unsuccessfully argued that the
government had denied their freedom of expression by not providing them
with funding or inviting them to consult or participate in constitutional
discussions leading up to the Charlottetown Accord. The Court held, as they
had in other cases,2 0 that "generally the government is under no obligation
to fund or provide a specific platform of expression to an individual or
group."21

The outcome of Native Women

Association of Canada v.

Canadawould likely have been the same under the majority's Vancouver
TransportationAuthority reasoning. Under their analysis, because it was
NWAC themselves who were excluded, the Baier test would have applied
and the claim would be denied. However, what would be the analysis
under the majority's approach in Vancouver Transportation Authority
were a similar claim for funding and an opportunity to consult denied on
the basis that the government was not interested in hearing the viewpoint
sought to be expressed? The illogic of determining whether a positive
rights based analysis is to be engaged based on whether the restriction is as
to speaker or speech is revealed by this counterfactual. Certainly a request
to be included in government consultation is a claim for a positive right
(a claim of underinclusion)-it does not become a negative right simply
because it is denied on the basis that the government does not want to hear
what you have to say rather than denied on the basis that the government
does not want to hear what you have to say. Under the majority's approach
the Baier analysis would apply in NWAC were the case brought today, but
would not apply in the hypothetical just proposed. It makes little sense to
have the nature of the exclusion rather than the nature of the claim dictate
the analytical test to be applied.
Having drawn the distinction between exclusions based on speakers
and those based on content, and identified the claim in this case as a
content-based exclusion, the Court went on to consider the appellant's
argument that the claim was for a positive right because the respondents
required their support and enablement to convey the messages in question.
The majority rightly clarifies that "if government support or enablement

19.
20.
21.

[1994] 3 S.C.R. 627.
Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995.
Supra note 19 at 655.
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were all that was required to trigger a 'positive rights analysis,' it could be
argued that a claim brought by demonstrators seeking access to a public
park should be dealt with under the Baier analysis..."22 However, they
then go on to confuse the issue by stating that "[w]hen the reasons in
Baier are read as a whole, it is clear that 'support or enablement' must
be tied to a claim requiring the government to provide a particular means
of expression." 23 It seems right to suggest that a claim for government
enablement should not trigger the restrictive Dunmore/Baieranalysis. But
what does it mean to say that if this enablement is tied to a particular
government-created means of expression then a positive rights analysis
is triggered? The problem is that without something more this "test" for
triggering Baier does not avoid the very point the majority had just made
regarding claims to demonstrate in a public park. How can a request for a
permit to hold a demonstration on a public stage in a government-owned
park not be considered a claim that the government enable one to express
oneself through a particular government-created means of expression? But
the majority would agree that such a claim ought not to trigger Dunmore/
Baier. However, they would do so based on the questionable conclusion
that such a claim was not a request that the government enable expressive
activity by providing them with a particular means from which they would
otherwise be excluded.
In Vancouver TransportationAuthority, the majority determined that
the respondents "are not requesting that the government support or enable
their expressive activity by providing them with a particular means of
expression from which they are excluded."24 Really? Are they not? This
conclusion on the part of the majority turns wholly on the distinction they
draw between speakers and speech. Once one acknowledges that this is
more of a distinction without a difference, the assertion that claimants who
are asking that the government sell them advertising space on public buses
are not requesting that the government enable their expressive activity by
providing them with a particular means of expression from which they
have been excluded, becomes hollow.
Attempting to characterize a claim based on the restriction or the
alleged under inclusivity at issue (rather than identifying whether what is
being sought is of the same ilk as the type of claim in which this principle
regarding positive rights under section 2(b) was established) creates the
difficult task of trying to parse out the difference between positive versus

22.
23.
24.

Supra note I at para. 34.
Ibid. at para. 35.
Ibid.
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negative 'government action, enablement versus enablement tied to a
particular means of expression, granting versus taking away, excluding
versus not including, statutorily created government platforms versus
non-statutorily created government platforms and of course speakers
versus speeches.
3. What JusticeDeschamps could have done
There may be another way to approach this type of dispute that does not
require this problematic and false distinction between the speaker and the
speech. Instead of characterizing the claim based on the type of restriction
imposed or the basis for the underinclusion alleged (as the majority does),
a better approach would be to characterize based only on an examination
of the claim itself: what exactly is the expressive right being sought and
is it of the same ilk as the type of claim in which this principle regarding
positive rights under section 2(b) was established? In this case it is the
right to access a government-created space for private advertising.
In his concurring opinion in Vancouver Transportation Authority
Justice Fish, who dissented from the majority in Baie, adopted an
analysis that does almost this. His approach is based on an examination
of the claim itself rather than on the nature of the restriction. He adopted
a more direct approach to rejecting the assertion of the transit authority
that a positive rights (Dunmore/Baier) analysis ought to be applied.
Justice Fish suggested that courts ought to consider whether the freedom
of expression claimed would impose on the government "a significant
burden of assistance, in the form of expenditure of public funds, or the
initiation of a complex legislative, regulatory or administrative scheme or
undertaking."25
The approach to section 2(b) and the "positive rights versus negative
rights" issue advanced below is similar to the one adopted by Justice
Fish-although it would potentially result in a more explicitly restrictive
standard as to when Dunmore/Baier applies than would Justice Fish's

25.

Supra note I at para. 103
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approach. 26 The approach suggested in the paragraphs to follow is that i)
the issue should be characterized based solely on the nature of the claim
not the nature of the restriction and ii) that the Dunmore/Baieranalysis
should only apply where the claim fits within one of the two types of
claims for which this principle regarding positive rights under section 2(b)
was established and is typically found.
If the claim is of the sort in which this notion about "positive rights"
under section 2(b) was developed, the Dunmore/Baier criteria should
apply. If it is not one of these two types of claims (discussed below),
then the regular City of Montreal approach to expressive rights on public
property should be adopted. This will ensure a limited application of the
very restricted guarantee provided for under the Dunmore/Baiercriteria,
without resorting to the problematic reasoning adopted by the majority in
Vancouver TransportationAuthority.
There have typically been two types of cases in which a section 2(b)
argument has been denied on the basis that the claimant seeks a positive
right that the government is not obligated to provide. The first category
of cases in which expressive rights have been denied on the basis that the
claim places a positive obligation on the government not required by the
Constitution are cases involving claims for a right to be consulted by the
government-a right to have the ear of law or policy makers if others have
been given that ear. In other words, these cases involved a claim that section
2(b) requires that where the government has created a means or forum for
itself to access or receive opinion or information, then the government is
required to hear about every opinion or viewpoint, or from every group or
individual seeking to be consulted. The audience in these types of cases
is small-it is either the government or some narrowly defined audience
created by the government. In fact, it was a case of this nature in which
the Court first determined that section 2(b) does not generally guarantee a
right to government-created platforms of expression. The case was Haig
26. There is a separate issue with respect to Justice Fish's decision. It is not consistent with the
Court's line of jurisprudence regarding the use of public property for expressive purposes. After
disposing of the positive rights issue, he does not then apply the test established in City of Montreal,
supra note 4. Instead he reverts back to Justice Lamer's approach in the pre-City of Montreal case
of Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, supra note 4. The problem with a test
that relies exclusively on compatibility with government function is, as Professor Moon notes in
discussing Lamer's approach, that it requires a judicial determination as to the function of a location
but does not offer any stable criteria by which to ascertain what constitutes manifest incompatibility.
See Moon, supra note 4. This was the very issue the Court attempted to avoid in City of Montreal by
adopting the unified approach that is currently the binding precedent on how to determine the scope of
protection under 2(b) for expression on public property. Justice Fish's decision, even setting aside his
resolution of the positive rights Dunmore/Baier issue, is a complete departure from current case law
on expressive rights on public property.
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v. Canadaand it involved a claimed right to vote in a referendum.27 While
the right to vote in federal and provincial elections is constitutionally
protected under section 3 of the Charter, the right to vote in referendums,
public opinion polls, or plebiscites is not. The Court was clear in Haigthat,
provided it is not done discriminatorily, the government can seek public
opinion-consult with the public or a segment of the public-by whatever
method it chooses. Section 2(b) does not circumscribe the government's
ability to choose its sources of expertise, advice and opinion.28
It is significant to note that a denied right to government consultation
was the context in which the principle that there is no general obligation on
the part of the government to provide access to government-created means
of, or platforms for, expression, was established by the Court. Indeed, many
of the cases in which a right to expression through a government-created
platform have been denied are of this consultation genre. In Siemens v.
Manitoba,for example, the Court found that there was no section 2(b) right
to be included in a referendum on prohibiting video lottery terminals. 29 In
Re Allman andNorthwest Territories(Commissioner) the N.W.T. Court of
Appeal upheld a three-year residency requirement to vote in a plebiscite
on whether the Northwest Territories should be divided.30 The court in
-Allman followed the ruling in Haig that, in seeking public opinion on an
issue, the government is not constitutionally obligated to seek everyone's
opinion. In NWAC, discussed above, the Court held that section 2(b)
does not constrain the government in its choice of advisors or require the
government to hear every viewpoint.3
There have been two decisions that one could characterize as of this
genre but with somewhat of a deviation from the typical government
consultation category of cases. In these cases the government itself was
not the audience for the platform. However, the claim in these cases was,
in large measure, for access to a narrowly-defined audience created by the
government to carry out government-related functions.
The first of these two cases is Office and Professional Employees'
International Union, Local 378 v. British Columbia (Hydro and Power
Authority).32 In this case the Union's claim that a rejection oftheirapplication
to have the Utilities Commission conduct a hearing to review B.C. Hydro's

27. Supra note 20.
28. As compared to, for example, section 15 or section 35, which do impact the government's ability
in this respect.
29. 2003 SCC 3, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6.
30. (1983), 8 D.L.R. ( 4 -) 230 (N.W.T.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1984] I S.C.R. v.
31. Supra note 19.
32. 2004 BCSC 422, [2004] B.C.J. No. 623.
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proposed outsourcing agreement violated section 2(b) was refused, on the
basis that the claim was for a positive right that the government was not
obligated to provide. The narrowly defined and statutorily constituted
audience to which the claimants sought access was the British Columbia
Utilities Commission. The British Columbia Utilities Commission is an
independent regulatory agency of the provincial government that operates
under, and administers, the Utilities Commission Act." It is a narrowly
defined audience created to carry out a particular government function.
The second case is Baier itself. Recall that in Baier the claimants
argued that it was a violation of section 2(b) to prohibit all teachers in
Alberta from standing for election to the office of school trustee and
serving as a school trustee.34 In order to be eligible for nomination, a
teacher is required under Alberta's legislation to obtain a leave of absence
from their position. Under the impugned law, if elected a teacher is
required to resign their teaching position. Recall that the majority denied
the claim on the basis that what the claimants sought was inclusion in an
underinclusive statutory scheme and that this was not a positive rights
claim which fulfilled the Dunmore criteria. The narrowly defined and
statutorily constituted audience to which the claimants sought access in
Baier was the school board of trustees. The claimants not only sought an
audience with the school board of trustees but also the ability to, if elected,
have decision-making powers as school board trustees.
The second type of claim in which expressive rights have been denied
on the basis that the claim places a positive obligation on the government
not required by the Constitution, are cases involving claims for governmentfunded expression. NWAC would also fall into this category of cases.
In addition to seeking the right to be consulted by the government, the
organization also unsuccessfully argued that their freedom of expression

33. R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 473.
34. Baier, supra note 9.
35. They also sought the ability to speak to the public in the capacity of school board trustee
nominee. As such, there is a critique of my reliance on Baier for the assertion that typically positive
rights under section 2(b) are recognized only where the claim is for an audience with the government
(or for government funding). The legislation at issue in Baier restricted teachers not only from serving
as trustees but also from even running for election as trustees unless they took a leave of absence from
teaching. One could argue that the running for election aspect of the claim involved a public audience
and not a narrowly defined government audience. There is merit to this claim. However, the fact that
teachers remain free under the legislative scheme to speak publicly about any of the education issues
that they would express as a school board trustee candidate and the not unreasonable presumption
that the central issue in Baier was the right of teachers to actually serve as school board trustees
supports the suggestion that the more significant audience at issue in Baier was the school board and
the provincial government that the board serves.
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had been denied because the government had provided funding to other
aboriginal organizations, but not to NWAC.
Hogan v. Newfoundland also involved a claim of this nature.36 In
Hogan the Newfoundland Court of Appeal determined that section 2(b)
did not require the Newfoundland government to impose spending limits
on referendum campaigns so that each viewpoint would be equally
expressed to the voters; nor, the Court determined, did section 2(b) require
the government to provide funding to the "No" side simply because they
had funded the "Yes" side.
Finally, in Criminal Trial Lawyers Association v. Alberta (SolicitorGeneral)the Edmonton Remand Centre had instituted a new phone system
that allowed inmates to place only collect calls.37 As such, inmates were
unable to call cell phones. The Criminal Trial Lawyers Association argued
that this was a violation of the inmates' section 2(b) rights. The Alberta
Court of Queen's Bench determined that there was no obligation on the
government to pay for inmate calls.
It seems reasonable to very narrowly define the scope of protected
expression in cases where claimants are demanding the government's ear
or asking the government to spend money so that one can express oneself.
With respect to these types of claims a positive rights Dunmore/Baier
analysis may be appropriate. Such an approach leaves at least some space
for recognition of those circumstances in which, without a governmentsponsored megaphone or an audience with the government, a defacto gag
is produced. However, this approach also leaves the government relatively
free to consult with whomever it sees fit" and unrestrained in its discretion

225.
36. 2000 NFCA 12, [2000] 183 D.L.R. (41h)
37. 2004 ABQB 534, [2004] A.J. No. 838.
38. There are of course instances where the government is under a duty to consult, such as the
constitutionally-protected requirement that they consult with aboriginal groups whose potential treaty
or aboriginal rights are at stake. As well, a government that acts discriminatorily in its decisions
regarding consultation and funding for expression continues to be subject to the equality protections
guaranteed under section 15 of the Charter.
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(in this context) to allocate funds as it deems appropriate.39 Application
of the Dunmore/Baier criteria and discussion about positive government
obligations, positive rights, government-created platforms and degree of
government action required should be confined to the types of claims in
which the principle that the government is under no obligation to provide
for a particular means of expression was introduced-claims of entitlement
to the government's ear or the government's purse.
There is a qualitative difference between a claim such as the one
made in Vancouver TransportationAuthority and a claim for the right
to be consulted by the government, to access a government commission
or to receive government funding in order to express one's message. In
Vancouver TransportationAuthority the intended audience was the public
at large, not the government or a narrowly defined audience constituted
by the government. The government-created platform at issue was one
that was open to the public and aimed at a public audience. It was, in
this sense, more like a telephone pole or "Speaker's Corner" in a public
park than a right to be consulted by the government during constitutional
deliberations.40 The claimants did not seek government funding; indeed
"enabling" their expressive abilities in this case would generate revenue
for the government. The transit authorities' argument that the Dunmore/
Baier analysis ought to apply to the facts of Vancouver Transportation
Authority should have been dismissed on the basis that the claim sought
was unrelated to the very narrow circumstances in which a positive rights
39.. The issue of to what extent the Charter guarantees positive right-places positive obligations on
the government-is a difficult one and one which varies depending on the provision at issue. In terms
of section 2(b), for practical and pragmatic reasons alone it is reasonable to assume that a government
cannot, but for highly particularized reasons such as those identified in Dunmore, be required to
consult with everyone and anyone interested in advising them on a particular matter. Similarly,
the reality of finite public resources and the existence of a democratically elected body vested with
the responsibility of distributing those resources suggests that a constitutionally entrenched right
to expression should not ordinarily give rise to a judicial order to government to distribute those
resources in a particular manner. That said, for the same reason that Quebec's prohibition on private
health insurance was determined to violate section 7 of the Charter in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney
General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] I S.C.R. 791 and that Ontario's exclusion of agricultural workers from
labour law protection was said to violate section 2(d) in Dunmore, supra note 10, there will be cases
where a confluence of factual circumstances, statutory or legal regimes, and/or government actions
suggests that section 2(b) does provide a right to the government's ear or government's purse. Given
both of these considerations, application of the Dunmore criteria for section 2(b) claims to a right to
be consulted by the government or the right to receive funding from the government for expressive
purposes seems reasonable. The problem focused on in this paper is not whether positive rights under
section 2(b) should be circumscribed, nor whether Dunmore is the correct test once a claim haS been
properly characterized as a positive rights claim. The problem focused on here is how and when to
properly characterize section 2(b) claims as positive rights claims.
40. The majority acknowledges this later in their decision under the section where they apply City of
Montreal in order to determine whether the form or location of the expression limits protection. See
supra note 1 at para. 43.
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type analysis was intended to apply. The majority ought to have assessed
the nature of the claim and rejected a positive rights approach on that basis
rather than examining the nature of the restriction, making distinctions
between the speaker and the speech and then engaging in an analysis that
attempts to parse out in some principled manner the distinction between
government action and inaction, or government enablement tied to
government-created means versus general government enablement.
There are a number of factors that a court ought to consider in an
assessment as to whether a claim requires the Dunmore/Baieranalysis. A
court ought to consider the intended audience, the cost to the government
and perhaps the government's purpose in creating the particular means
at issue. Where an assessment of these factors indicates that a claim is
qualitatively similar to the types of claims in which the principle regarding
access to government platforms was established, then the Dunmore/
Baier analysis could be applied. Where the claim is not for a right to be
consulted by the government or for a right to government funding then on
that basis alone the Dunmore/Baier analysis, regardless of the nature of
the restriction, should not be applied.
The majority's approach to Baier is not the only difficulty with the
decision in Vancouver TransportationAuthority. As suggested above, the
majority's discussion regarding justification for the section 2(b) violation
under section 1 also raises potential issues. 4 1
II. The Court' section 1 analysis
Having determined that the transit authorities' policies violated section
2(b) of the Charter the majority turned to section 1 to determine whether
this violation could be justified. They determined that although the transit
authorities' policies were prescribed by law, the policies were not justified
in a free and democratic society. The specific language of the contested
policies was as follows:
2. Advertisements, to be accepted, shall be limited to those which
communicate information concerning goods, services, public service
announcements and public events.
7. No advertisement will be accepted which is likely, in the light of
prevailing community standards, to cause offence to any person or group
of persons or create controversy;
9. No advertisement will be accepted which advocates or opposes
any ideology or political philosophy, point of view, policy or action, or
41. While Justice Fish took issue with the majority's approach to the section 2(b) analysis, his
reasons did not articulate a departure with respect to the majority's section I analysis.
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which conveys information about a political meeting, gathering or event,
a political party or the candidacy of any person for a political position or
public office.42
The majority held that while the policies were adopted for a sufficiently
important objective-to provide a safe and welcoming public transit
system-the limits created by the policies were not rationally connected
to this objective. They stated that
[i]t is not the political nature of an advertisement that creates a dangerous
or hostile environment. Rather, it is only ifthe advertisement is offensive
in that, for example, its content is discriminatory or it advocates violence
or terrorism-regardless of whether it is commercial or political in
nature-that the objective of providing a safe and welcoming transit
system will be undermined.43
According to their reasoning, the line to be drawn is between offensive and
inoffensive advertisements-it is only a restriction on offensive content
that will be rationally connected to the objective of providing a safe and
welcoming public transit system.
They went on to determine that even had there been a rational connection
between the objective and the limits imposed by articles 2, 7 and 9, they
would have found them to be unreasonable and disproportionate. Recall,
Article 2 excluded political advertisements and Article 9 prohibited all
political advertising-making them overly broad according to the Court.
Article 7 excluded any advertisement likely to cause offence to any person
or group of persons or create controversy, as determined by the prevailing
community standards of tolerance. The majority concluded that Article 7
was also unnecessarily broad. "While a community standard of tolerance
may constitute a reasonable limit on offensive advertisements, excluding
advertisements which 'create controversy' is unnecessarily broad." 44
Again, it is only offensive advertising that will undermine the objective of a
safe and welcoming transit system. Citizens, they concluded, are expected
to put up with some controversy in a free and democratic society.45
It seems right to suggest that citizens are expected to put up with
some degree of controversy. The difficulty is in determining a principled
and just distinction between what constitutes offensive advertisement
on government-owned property and what are merely controversial
advertisements on government-owned property. Unfortunately, as
42. Supra note I at para. 4.
43. Ibid at para. 76.
44. Ibid at para. 77.
45. Ibid
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discussed below, this is a challenge to which the reasons in Vancouver
Transportation Authority gives only partial and notably problematic
guidance. The decision focused primarily on political advertising as that
was what was at issue in Vancouver TransportationAuthority. However,
the Court drew conclusions and made suggestions which, when considered
in the context of advocacy advertising, are problematic.
As the majority noted, the fact that the policies in this case are overly
broad and not rationally connected to their objective does not mean that
the government cannot limit speech in public transit advertisements. The
difficulty with their section I analysis is that the only guidance it provides
for how the government might place those limits-that is, draw the line
between offensive and merely controversial content-is the community
standards of tolerance test.
While they did not outright adopt the community standards of tolerance
test they suggested twice that this may be the appropriate standard. Moreover,
it is the only possible standard that they discussed. It is first suggested in
their discussion regarding the overbreadth of Article 7. They stated that
"[w]hile a community standard of tolerance may constitute a reasonable
limit on offensive advertisements, excluding advertisements which 'create
controversy' is unnecessarily broad." 4 6 Second, they suggested that the
Canadian Code of Advertising Standards "could be used as a guide to
establish reasonable limits, including limits on discriminatory content or
on ads which incite or condone violence or other unlawful behaviour."47
Advertising Standards Canada's CanadianCode ofAdvertising Standards,
in addition to rejecting advertising that contains discriminatory content
or condones violence or unlawful behaviour also rejects advertising that
"display[s] obvious indifference to, or encourage[s], gratuitously and
without merit, conduct or attitudes that offend the standards of public
48
decency prevailing among a significant segment of the population."
To illuminate the distinction between protected expression and
offensive expression, the Court juxtaposed the political speech at issue in
this case with content that is discriminatory or condones violence. There
is however, a vast space on the freedom of expression spectrum between
political speech at one end and discriminatory or violence-inciting speech
towards the other end. Consider again the examples suggested in the
opening paragraph: an advertisement denying the existence of God, an

46. Supra note I at para. 77.
47. Ibid. at para. 79.
48. See AdvertisingStandards Canada, The Canadian Code ofAdvertising Standards, online <http://
www.adstandards.com/en/Standard/canCodeOfAdStandards.aspx> at Clause 14(d).
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advertisement quoting Leviticus 20:13 or an advertisement depicting an
aborted fetus and declaring that abortion is murder. These are the types of
advertisements that already have caused controversy or are very likely to
soon arise and cause controversy for public transit officials across Canada. 49
Are these advertisements merely controversial or are they offensive and
by what standard ought courts to make this assessment?
The only indication of how to approach this question revealed in the
Court's decision is their implicit endorsement of the community standards
of tolerance test-a standard that hasfinally been rejected in the very line
of cases that they cite as authority for the principle that the government
can constitutionally place criminal prohibitions on speech (or action)
based on the location where the expression is to occur and the audience to
which it will be directed."o Not only did they suggest that an assessment of
what a significant segment of the public would consider decent may be an
appropriate measure as to what constitutes a justifiable limit on expression
in this context, but it is presumably the community standards of tolerance
test as it stood in the earlier obscenity and indecency cases rather than in its
later post-Butler harm-based version. That is to say, it is a standard based
on an assessment as to what the community would tolerate others viewing
or hearing rather than an assessment as to what the community would
tolerate in terms of harm arising from such expression. The latter harmbased community standard, asserted by courts in the obscenity context to
be more objective, would be a more onerous standard for the government
to meet under section 1; it was not referred to by the Court and is not
referred to in the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards (to which, as
noted above, they also referred). Certainly, the reported adjudications
of complaints by Advertising Standards Canada's Consumer Response
Council indicates that the standard is not based on harm but rather based
on notions of propriety and decency."

49. Supra note 2.
50. Supra note I at para 78 where they cite R. v. Labaye, 2005 SCC 80, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728. In R. v.
Labaye, Chief Justice McLachlin determined that indecency should be defined based on constitutional
values such as autonomy, liberty, equality and human dignity rather than an assessment as to the
degree of harm that the community would tolerate arising from a particular sexual behaviour.
51. See for example a 2004 determination of the Council upholding a complaint that an advertisement
which depicted two women kissing passionately was highly offensive and inappropriate for viewing
during family programming and therefore violated clause 14 of the Code. Clause 14 prohibits
unacceptable portrayals and depictions on the basis that they would disregard prevailing standards of
decency among a significant segment of the population (<http://www.adstandards.com/en/Standards/
adComplaintsReports.asp?periodquarter-I&periodyear-2004>). A review of the Council's other
adjudications in 2008 and 2009 suggests that this case, far from being an anomaly, is indicative of the
way in which their community standards of tolerance assessment seems to operate.
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Allowing the government to rely on the "standards of public decency
prevailing among a significant segment of the population" as a yardstick
to justify content-based limits on access to government-created means of
expression is problematic. For the purposes ofcircumscribing constitutional
freedoms and protections, determining what is offensive should not be
done based on majoritarian notions of decency. This risks both justifying
government censorship based on majoritarian attitudes and perspectives as
well as failing to protect an "insignificant segment of the population" from
content that the majority of the population would not find offensive.
It is one thing for an independent self-regulatory agency founded
by the advertising industry, or an individual broadcaster, newspaper, or
billboard owner, to censor content based on their assessment of what a
"significant segment of the population" considers decent. Provided this is
done in a manner that does not contravene human rights code protections,
private actors are entitled to censor advertising in whatever manner
best suits their business or personal interests. It is quite another matter,
however, to allow the government to justify content-based limits on the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression on the basis of an
adjudicator's subjective assessment as to what the majority of Canadians,
or a significant segment of Canadians, consider decent.
In the context of criminally regulating obscenity and indecency, the
courts ultimately determined that the community standards of tolerance test
was too subjective-that it would not ensure against a judge substituting
his or her own moral perspective or degree of tolerance for that of the
community's perspective or degree of tolerance. This is why the notion of
harm was eventually incorporated into the doctrine52 and in part why the
community standards test was eventually rejected."
Even assuming that it were possible for a judge to assess accurately and
objectively the community's sense of decency, it is questionable whether
this should be the constitutional marker used to distinguish between what
the government can justifiably censor on the basis that it is offensive and
what must be permitted as merely controversial.
Take for example the facts in Gay Alliance Toward Equality v.
Vancouver Sun.54 In this 1979 case, the Vancouver Sun refused to include
in their classified section an advertisement promoting a magazine
entitled "Gay Tide." They refused on the grounds that homosexuality is
offensive to public decency, that the advertisement would offend some

52.
53.
54.

R. v. Towne Cinema Theatres Lid, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 494; R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
Labaye, supra note 50.
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 435, S.C.J. No. 55.
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of the paper's subscribers and that the newspaper had a duty to protect
the morals of the community.5 The British Columbia Court of Appeal,
whose decision was affirmed on appeal,' determined that the Vancouver
Sun had not violated the B.C. Human Rights Code.17 They determined
that homosexuality was controversial, that a significant segment of the
public would consider homosexuality an offence against public decency
and that the Vancouver Sun therefore had a reasonable cause for refusing
the classified advertisement. A newspaper, provided it does not violate
human rights codes," is entitled to cater to the sensibilities of its clientele.
But should the government be similarly entitled?
Imagine if the Vancouver transit authorities had been selling
advertising space in 1982 (after section 2 of the Charter was in effect
but before sexual orientation was protected under section 15 and before
public sensibilities about the decency of homosexuality had evolved).
Had they refused an advertisement for subscriptions to a gay magazine,
would it be acceptable to justify this violation of section 2(b) on the basis
that a pro-homosexuality advertisement "display[s] obvious indifference
to, or encourage[s], gratuitously and without merit, conduct or attitudes
that offend the standards of public decency prevailing among a significant
segment of the population"?59
Consider the more contemporary examples suggested above. Should
majoritarian perspectives on what is tolerable for others to view dictate
whether the government can justifiably censor an advertisement denying
the existence of god on the basis that it is offensive rather than merely
controversial? What about a graphic pro-life advertisement, a homophobic
advertisement or perhaps advertising that promotes the decriminalization
of polygamy or labour rights for sex workers?
Assuming that the answer to these questions is in the negative-that
majoritarian perspectives ought not to dictate what is constitutionally
justifiable government censorship-then. what should be the standard
of justification? How should courts decide what can, in the context of
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. The Supreme Court of Canada found that the provision on unreasonably denying services
to the public did not apply to classified advertising. Regardless, as Professor Bruce Ryder points out,
Justice Martland "seemed to suggest that the Sun was free to take a position on 'the controversial
subject of homosexuality' and reject the ad on the basis of its opposition to equal rights for gay men
and lesbians." See Bruce Ryder, "Family Status, Sexuality and 'The Province of the Judiciary': The
Implications of Mossop v. A.G. Canada" (1993) 13 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 3 at 37.
57. [1977] B.C.J. No. 1218 (C.A.).
58. Sexual orientation was not, at that time, a prohibited ground of discrimination under the British
Columbia Human Rights Code. The unreasonable denial of a publicly available service to anyone was,
however, prohibited.
59. Canadian Advertising Standards, supra note 47.

78 The Dalhousie Law Journal

advertising on government-owned property, be justifiably censored?
Should the line be drawn between offensive and controversial content? If
so should determinations as to what is offensive be based on assessments
of majoritarian notions of decency?
1. ChiefJustice McLachlin "liberty two-step"
In fact, there may be an analytical approach to making these sorts of
determinations that does not rely on judicial assessments as to majoritarian
perspectives on what would offend notions of decency. With respect to
the definition of indecency (and presumably also obscenity) the Court has
come to the conclusion that limits on sexual expression should be dictated
by those fundamental principles underpinning Canadian society, such as
the values reflected in the Constitution, rather than an assessment of the
community's standards of tolerance for the degree of harm posed by the
sexual activity at issue.60 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority
in Labaye, determined that principles such as equality, autonomy, liberty
and dignity ought to dictate limits on sexual liberty.6' In other words, she
relied on constitutional values in order to both define the scope of, and to
protect, those same values. This analytical approach to the circumscription
of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms-an approach that might be
described as "the liberty two-step"-is also revealed in Chief Justice
McLachlin's approach to religious liberty and in her approach to the scope
of section 2(b) protection on publicly owned property generally.
In "Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective,"
Chief Justice McLachlin attempts to reconcile the tension between
freedom of religion and the rule of law (what she describes as a "dialectic
of normative commitments"; i.e., two different, and at times competing,
comprehensive systems of belief) by distinguishing between two orders
of values: a first order of normative positions or goods that society has
identified as valuable and in need of protection and a second order of core
values from which all other normative positions are judged.62 She argues
that the Constitution articulates both. She suggests that the Charter has
entrenched freedom of religion as one of our society's goods but that in
addition, in defining the scope of that good, the law must rely on those
values (hyper goods) that freedom of religion protects. The core values

60. Labaye, supra note 50.
61. Ibid.
62. Beverly McLachlin, "Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective" in
Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueen's University Press, 2004) 12.
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she identifies are autonomy, human dignity and respect for the parallel
rights of others.
In Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, Justice
McLachlin (as she then was). proposed that the scope of protected
expression on government owned property ought to be determined
based on whether the expression at issue was in pursuit of the purposes
underpinning the guarantee of freedom of expression." Under her approach
in Commonwealth of Canadaa prohibition on expression on governmentowned property will fall outside the scope of section 2(b) protection
unless the person seeking access is pursuing one the following three
purposes: seeking truth, participation in decision-making or individual
self-fulfillment. Her approach was modified somewhat by the current test
for section 2(b) protection on public property."4 However, the current test
remains reliant on the higher order values underpinning the protection.
Under the current test, established in City ofMontreal, the scope of section
2(b) protection on public property will be based on
whether the place is a public place where one would expect constitutional
protection for free expression on the basis that expression in that
place does not .conflict with the purposes which s.2(b) is intended to
serve, namely (1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) selffulfillment.65
If fundamental values such as self-fulfillment, autonomy, equality,
liberty and human dignity can be applied to determine whether a particular
sexual act in a particular location constitutes one of indecency for purposes
of the criminal law, and can be applied to determine whether the scope of
religious freedom extends to a particular religious activity, can these same
principles be applied to determine whether a particular advertisement on a
public transit system is offensive?
2. Location, location, location
Consider again the examples discussed above: an advertisement denying
the existence of God, one quoting from Leviticus 20:13 and a pro-life
advertisement depicting an aborted fetus. It seems very difficult to imagine
how a judge would assess "the community's" tolerance for, or sense of
what is decent with respect to, any of these three examples. Would the
assessment depend on the community where the bus operates? Should
63. Committee, supra note 4.
64. The modifications to the test have made it more confusing-not because of her liberty two-step
but because it now seems to rely on the notion of two competing spheres of protected expression. See
supra note 2 for a discussion on this point.
65. City of Montreal, supra note 4 at para. 74.
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a judge consider what the religious communities in a particular location
would tolerate others viewing, or perhaps the queer community or the
feminist community? Is it the community at large that is to be considered?
Is it the business community?
Instead of attempting to determine the distinction between offensive
and controversial content based on a community standards test, perhaps
it would be helpful to consider the issue with reference to fundamental
values such as those reflected in the Constitution. What would be the
analysis if an assessment of "offensiveness" was done according to Chief
Justice McLachlin's liberty two-step?
In defining what constitutes an offensive advertisement on governmentowned property such as public buses it is likely that the same sorts of
fundamental values-such as liberty, autonomy, equality, and respect
for human dignity-that she has identified in defining indecency for the
purposes of the criminal law or in guiding the scope of protection for
religious freedom in a multicultural society could be applicable. While
the assessment of these values, and the factors relied upon to assess them,
will be different when considering religious freedom, the reach of the
criminal law, and advocacy advertising on government-owned property,
the analytical framework could likely be the same. So, for example, the
limits placed on what the government can criminally prohibit as indecent
sexual activity6 6 would likely be greater than the limits on. what they can
justifiably censor from public bus advertisements. However the values
(equality, dignity, autonomy and liberty) and the factors (such as location
and potential audience) used to determine these limits would be the same.
As the majority noted in Vancouver TransportationAuthority, location
matters, as does audience.67 At issue in this context are two locations, and
two types of audiences-both of which create circumstances of unwilling/
involuntary exposure to members of the public. The audiences are the
general public and transit users. The locations are: i) advertisements
placed on the outsides of buses and ii) advertisements placed on the insides
of buses. Citizens at large will be involuntarily exposed to advertisements
on the outside of buses in a fashion similar to the way one is involuntarily
exposed to protesters when one drives on-a public road or the way one
is involuntarily exposed to a parade as it passes by them. In each of
these instances the exposure is limited and likely brief and in most cases
66. While Labaye was a case on statutory interpretation, not a constitutional challenge, it was
certainly informed by, and considered in light of, those constitutional issues that would arise in a
Charter challenge to the criminal regulation of sexual activity.
67. See also Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R.
610.
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citizens have the ability to avert their eyes without much difficulty. Transit
users will also be exposed only briefly-although perhaps repeatedly-to
advertisements on the outsides of buses. However, transit users will also
be forced to ride on buses knowing what is on the outside of them.
Advertisements on the insides of buses are somewhat different. While
members of the public at large will not be exposed to them, transit users
will be involuntarily exposed and likely for longer periods and with less
ability to simply "not look at them."68
In Labaye Chief Justice McLachlin determined that activities which
cause (1) harm to those whose autonomy and liberty may be restricted
by being confronted with inappropriate conduct; (2) harm to society by
predisposing others to anti-social conduct; and (3) harm to individuals
participating in the conduct, would be indecent on the basis that such harm
threatens those fundamental values reflected in the Constitution.69
As noted, the bar for activities that will be criminally prohibited on
the basis that they are indecent will likely be higher than would be the
standard for determining what content might be advertised on the sides
of public buses. However some of the same factors should be relevant.
Chief Justice McLachlin determined that only serious and deeply offensive
moral assaults will fall under the first category of harm. Under the second
category, she determined that conduct that undermines respect for and
the dignity of targeted groups could violate formally recognized norms
reflected in Canada's constitution and other fundamental laws. (The third
category of harm identified in Labaye in the context of indecency is not as
relevant here.)
68. The Court in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
567, recently characterized driving as a privilege rather than a right, arguing that those unable for
religious reasons to comply with provincial driver's licence requirements could take the bus. Use of
the taxpayer-funded public transit system should be thought of more as a right than a privilege. It is
reasonable to suggest that individual transit users who "choose" to ride the bus have nonetheless been
involuntarily exposed to whatever advertisements are posted on the inside of the bus. In Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, supranote 4, both Justice Blackmun for the majority, and Justice Douglas in
concurrence, noted that the captive nature of the transit user audience was significant in ascertaining
the scope of IsI Amendment protection in a case with facts quite similar to Vancouver Transportation
Authority. Justice Douglas, in particular, noted in paras. 24 and 25 that "in my view the right of the
commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its
vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience."
He went on to emphasize that "[biuses are not recreational vehicles used for Sunday chautauquas as a
public park might be used on holidays for such a purpose; they are a practical necessity for millions in
our urban centers." In Lehman, unlike here, the issue of a captive audience was deemed relevant to the
scope of the protection itself rather than as a factor to consider when attempting to justify a violation
of the protection. Of course, in the American constitutional context, balancing must be done within
the scope of the protection itself because there is no constitutional provision analogous to section I of
the Charter
69. Supra note 50.
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Consider again the three examples suggested above. First, consider an
advertisement denying the existence of God. Placed on the outside of a bus
it is unlikely that such an advertisement would constitute a serious enough
moral assault such that it could be said to have impacted the autonomy
and liberty of those who were involuntarily but briefly exposed to it. It
seems unlikely that people would avoid streets where public buses travel.
The same might reasonably be concluded with respect to the pro-life
advertisement. However, if placed on the inside of the bus the analysis
would be different with respect to both of these advertisements. It seems
quite plausible that many people would avoid riding on a bus in which
they would be forced to sit across from the image of an aborted fetus. It
also seems plausible to suggest that some people would refuse to send
their children to school on a bus in which they would be inundated with
the message that they could be good without God. Such circumstances
would certainly circumscribe their liberty and autonomy.
Would either of these advertisements-placed on the outsides of
buses-undermine respect for and the dignity of a targeted group such
that fundamental societal values would be threatened? It is unlikely that
the humanist advertisement could be said to perpetuate this type of harm.
Whether the pro-life advertisement could be said to do this might depend
on its content. Perhaps the controversial ad with the depiction of an
aborted fetus would not cause this type of harm but it might be reasonable
to suggest that a declaration that abortion is murder would undermine the
dignity and respect of a targeted group-women.
Now consider the example of the advertisement quoting Leviticus
20:13: "If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of them
have done what is detestable. They must be put to death; their blood will be
on their own heads." As is the case with respect to the other two examples,
it seems unlikely that the placement of such an advertisement on the side
of a bus would adversely affect citizens' liberty or autonomy to the degree
contemplated in Labaye. It may be however, that an advertisement on the
side of a public bus suggesting death to all homosexuals could undermine
respect for and the dignity of gay, lesbian and transgender Canadians. It
is also plausible that gay and lesbian transit users would feel less at liberty
to take public transit should such a message confront them as they ride to
work or school.
The approach just suggested is not without difficulties. It still requires
a subjective assessment on the part of courts as to what level of harm to
autonomy, liberty, equality and dignity is required to justify this type of
government censorship. Whether one finds it a preferable approach to
the one suggested by the Court in Vancouver TransportationAuthority
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turns simply on whether one would prefer that determinations as to what
content the government can justifiably censor from public bus advertising
be based on an adjudicator's assessment of what will (or will not) offend
majoritarian notions of decency or on an adjudicator's assessment of the
potential harm to the autonomy, liberty, equality and dignity of the public
posed by the advertisement.
Conclusion
The majority in Vancouver TransportationAuthority rightly determined
that the respondent's claim was not one that should be subject to a positive
rights analysis. However, they based this finding on an implausible
distinction between laws or policies that exclude speakers versus those
that exclude the content of speech, and on an illusory distinction between
government enablement in general and government enablement tied to a
government-created means of expression. It is not logical to distinguish
claims of underinclusivity from claims for freedom from government
interference in expressive entitlements based on whether the government
action is directed towards restricting particular groups or individuals rather
than the particular content of expression. Instead of attempting to draw
distinctions between exclusions based on speakers and exclusions based
on the content of speech, a better approach for the Court to take would
be to characterize section 2(b) claims based on the nature of the claim
rather than the nature of the restriction and to only apply the positive rights
Dunmore/Baiercriteria where the claim is for the government's ear or the
government's purse.
As discussed, there is a second difficulty with the Court's reasoning
in Vancouver TransportationAuthority. Having determined that contentbased restrictions to government-owned advertising space violate section
2(b) of the Charter,the Court then considered what types of content the
government could justifiably censor under section I of the Charter The
Court determined that government actors can justifiably refuse to allow
offensive content in the advertising space they sell. Unfortunately, the only
direction the Court offered for how the distinction between offensive (and
justifiably censored) material might be distinguished from controversial
(and unjustifiably censored) material was the community standards of
tolerance test. A section 1 analysis premised on community standards of
tolerance leaves sparse and problematic guidance for determining what
constitutes offensive and what constitutes controversial advertising.
Instead, the Court should have resorted to the fundamental and core
principles underpinning Canada's constitutional consensus-principles
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such as autonomy, equality, dignity and respect for the parallel rights of
others.

